other levels have occasionally responded to pleas for the protection of both constructed and unmodified sacred sites. 3 But despite sporadic acknowledgments of sacred-site contributions to individual, communal, and ecological vitality, surging tides of demographic, technological, and economic change overwhelm most calls to leave American Indian sacred sites alone. The potential for conflict over sacred sites is particularly high where land developments and resource extractions have already encompassed and excluded indigenous peoples, geographies, and value systems, and where additional impacts to people and places are likely. The United States and Canada often oppose calls for recognizing the rights of Aboriginal peoples, overlook moral and legal mandates for just treatment, and ignore pleas for the protection of sacred sites. 4 This article examines opportunities and impediments relating to the protection of American Indian sacred sites in the United States. Our data and perspective derive from advocacy on behalf of American Indian sacred sites and from related efforts to guide government decisions toward respect for land-based religious practice and recognition of federal trust responsibility for the well-being of tribes, tribal members, and generations yet to come. A review of federal laws and court decisions relating to sacred sites provides a point of departure for examining ongoing conflicts pertinent to the development of the Mount Graham International Observatory (MGIO) by a consortium led by the University of Arizona. 5 The observatory is located atop Dził Nchaa Si An ("Big Seated Mountain," also known as the Pinaleño Mountains), a sacred site in southeastern Arizona considered holy by all of the region's tribes and to be of particular significance to the Western Apache Nation or Ndee (see fig. 1 ). 6 Our examination of efforts to halt desecration and ecosystem destruction by MGIO provides the basis for a critical review of federal agencies' applications of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the most common tool used to protect sacred sites on public lands. 7 Instead of protection per se, NHPA requires consultations to identify sites having historical, cultural, and religious importance; determine whether the prospective effects of the proposed federal actions will be adverse; and avoid and reduce any adverse effects. Because of the great latitude available to agency decision makers and the central importance of the consultative process, we conclude with recommendations to improve pivotal aspects of consultations concerning American Indian sacred sites.
At the risk of disappointing some readers, this is not a discussion of Apache religion, the sacredness of Dził Nchaa Si An, or the complex relationships between the mountain and Apaches. Instead, we employ Mount Graham in a case study intended to assess and improve the performance of the US historic preservation program in relation to American Indian sacred-site protection. The study illuminates the Mount Graham case, illustrates issues and dynamics affecting the protection of sacred sites elsewhere, and indicates means for enhancing consultations relating to sacred-site protection and decisions affecting place-based communities more generally. We refer to the religious significance of Dził Nchaa Si An, generally relying on language from Apache individuals and official documents rather than our interpretations. In further accord with Western Apache mandates to show respect and to manifest respect through avoidance, we refrain from qualifying or explicitly characterizing the links between Dził Nchaa Si An and those who revere and rely upon the mountain. 8 Our intention in this avoidance is to leave discriminations between the sacred and the profane to affected religious communities. 9 Dził Nchaa Si An provides a well-documented and compelling basis for considering specific implications of US authorities (that is, court decisions, laws, regulations, and policies) for on-the-ground protection of American Indian sacred sites. Despite a unique history of legislative intervention promoting the observatory's initial construction, efforts by Western Apache tribes and their allies highlight how existing authorities may be applied in order to achieve modest protections for Dził Nchaa Si An. Our review of court decisions and laws that set parameters and create opportunities for sacred-site protection reveals the discretion available to federal agencies in order to protect sacred sites in general and Dził Nchaa Si An in particular. The case study examines machinations underlying federal agency approval of sacred-site desecration, raising broader questions about federal agency trust responsibilities and undue political and special-interest influences in agency decision making.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Setting aside differences between Indian and Euro-American land ethics, conflicts over Mount Graham and other sacred sites in the United States may be discussed as products of persistent discontinuities between the legal statuses of American Indians and sacred sites, as well as between these juridical statuses and prevailing federal administrative practice. 10 The legal statuses of American Indians and of sacred sites as places of worship have been determined through hundreds of acts and decisions by legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government reaching back to the ratification of the US Constitution in 1787. The Constitution's First Amendment, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," creates twin mandates to protect religious communities from government and to insulate government from religious communities. Tension between the establishment and free exercise clauses of the Constitution persists despite Supreme Court efforts at reconciliation.
Before turning to specific cases involving American Indians and the First Amendment, we note acknowledgment in Article VI of the US Constitution that treaties with Indian tribes are the "supreme law of the land." This affirmation of tribal sovereignty obliges government-to-government relations and distinguishes "Indian affairs as a unique area of federal concern." 11 The net effect of treaties, acts of Congress, court decisions, executive orders, and patterns in US-Indian relations boils down to the recognition that Indians require special consideration because of their imposed dependence upon external government. By taking America from its original Native owners, the government "has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust." 12 This is a primary basis for the "Trust Doctrine" guiding federal relations with Indians. 13 Federal fiduciary responsibility for American Indians exists specifically in duties to honor treaty-based rights and privileges and to manage Indian trust lands and their bounties in the best interests of beneficiaries. More generally, trust responsibility extends to an obligation on the part of executive branch agencies to manage their relationships with tribes and Indians in accord with fiduciary principles and mandates to protect "the sovereignty of each tribal government." 14 Most specific US trust responsibilities are delegated to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service. Generic fiduciary duty exists wherever executive branch agencies communicate with or otherwise affect tribes or tribal members. 15 Trust duty thus extends to the departments of Agriculture (home of the US Forest Service [USFS]), Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Interior, and so forth, as well as to independent agencies, notably the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), the federal executive oversight agency designated to interpret NHPA and related federal authorities pertaining to sacred sites. 16 Because of these deep roots for US commitments to both Indian wellbeing and separation of church and state, constitutional issues often arise when these parallel interests converge. Initial litigation involving the free exercise clause affirmed constitutional protection of all forms of belief, while limiting the range of protected religious conduct. 17 Later Supreme Court decisions allowed government action to burden religious conduct or practice only when justified by a compelling governmental interest pursued through minimally burdensome means.
Given that many sacred-site conflicts boil down to links between sites and religious practice, it is important to understand legal precedents determining how far the government may (or must) go in either limiting or protecting conduct in relation to sacred sites. In determining the reach of the establishment clause, the Supreme Court has confirmed that the government may not-except under specific circumstances-give a religious organization preferential treatment through either benefits or exemptions. The "Accommodation Doctrine" defines establishment clause exceptions: special government treatment of a religious organization is allowed only when a generally applicable law or regulation would otherwise interfere with free exercise and when the law or regulation: (1) has a secular purpose; (2) has a principal effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) does not foster governmental-religious entanglement. 18 The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA) was Congress' effort to codify the Accommodation Doctrine and thereby rectify governmental and social abridgement of American Indian religious freedoms. 19 AIRFA states, in part, that "it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites."
As enacted, AIRFA provided a means for combating desecration to and disturbance of sacred sites. However, a pivotal Supreme Court case, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, brought the Accommodation Doctrine and AIRFA's effectiveness under intense scrutiny in relation to the establishment and free exercise clauses. 20 The Lyng case arose in response to USFS plans to permit timber harvesting and road construction in and through a site considered holy by three California tribes. The tribes contended that the sacred-site disturbance would burden the free exercise of their religion. Instead of applying the compelling interest test, however, the Supreme Court's 1988 decision found that AIRFA was an unenforceable expression of a congressional policy and that incidental effects of government programs having no tendency to coerce individuals into acting against their religious beliefs do not require government justification, even where they may interfere with religious practice. In its insistence that the government action did not deny access to rights, benefits, or privileges-that is, that the logging did not preclude religious belief even though it would inhibit the practice of that religion-the Lyng decision disarmed substantive AIRFA-based rights to protect sacred sites. 21 By limiting the legal options available for safeguarding sacred sites, the Lyng decision ushered in an era of sacred-site advocacy employing less directly relevant authorities.
Another Supreme Court case central to sacred-site protection involved not a specific site, but how far government may intrude into state affairs to protect religious freedom. The court's 1990 decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith upheld the dismissal of two state employees who made religious use of peyote as members of the Native American Church. 22 Congress' response to this ruling, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), reinstated compelling interest as a test for government impositions on religion. 23 RFRA prohibits substantial government burdens on free exercise-including the sort of generally applicable law that impeded religious freedom in the Smith case-unless the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means for doing so. The Supreme Court later invalidated RFRA's applications to state laws on the Fourteenth Amendment grounds that RFRA infringed on state's rights and exceeded Congress' remedial powers. 24 Congress subsequently amended RFRA in response to that Supreme Court opinion. 25 Surviving RFRA mandates prohibiting federal actions that substantially burden religious freedoms have yet to provide protection for American Indian sacred sites, obliging tribes and sacred-site advocates to plead their cases to land managers instead of judges. 26 
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND AGENCY DISCRETION
Taking into consideration the power that federal land managers have over the fate of sacred sites, this section reviews legislative and executive branch authorities relevant to agency decision making. Most of these authorities were created in the aftermath of the Lyng decision in order to counter persistent threats to American Indian cultural heritage.
The 1992 amendments to NHPA boost requirements for agencies to consult with potentially affected tribes on various matters, including areas of the effect of agency undertakings (that is, projects, programs, or permits), the identification of historic properties, whether a proposed undertaking will affect a property, and how to avoid or reduce adverse effects where these occur. The NHPA amendments also recognize the rights of tribes to assume State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) functions for Indian lands and, importantly, expand the definition of historic properties to include sites of cultural and religious significance. 27 The 1992 amendments to the NHPA also expand the ACHP membership to include a representative of the Native American and Native Hawai'ian communities.
The revised definition obliges federal agency consideration of what are often referred to as traditional cultural properties (TCPs), meaning a place "that is eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places because of its association with cultural practices and beliefs that are (1) rooted in the history of a community, and (2) are important to maintaining the continuity of that community's traditional beliefs and practices." 28 Sacred sites are typically viewed as a particularly venerable class of TCPs. The changes prompted by the inclusion of TCPs have transformed NHPA-mandated processes to identify, assess, and resolve adverse effects to historic properties.
The NHPA amendments did not provide protection for sacred sites separate from the considerations given to other historic properties. Clinton's 1996 Executive Order (EO) No. 13007 on American Indian sacred sites further ensconced AIRFA as federal policy by explicitly directing federal land managers to accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners and to "protect the physical integrity" of such sacred sites. EO 13007 defines the term sacred site as "any specific, discrete, narrowly delineated location on Federal land that is identified by an Indian tribe, or Indian individual determined to be an appropriately authoritative representative of an Indian religion, as sacred by virtue of its established religious significance to, or ceremonial use by, an Indian religion." Signed by President Clinton in 2000, EO 13175 requires federal agencies to (1) be guided "by principles of respect for Indian tribal self-government and sovereignty, for tribal treaty and other rights, and for responsibilities that arise from the unique legal relationship between the Federal government and Indian tribes," and (2) maintain "an effective process to permit elected officials and other representatives of Indian tribal governments to provide meaningful and timely input." 29 Ostensibly created to address American Indian concerns, EO 13007 and EO 13175 are nonetheless explicit in denying the creation of any additional rights, benefits, or trust responsibilities that would be enforceable by anyone other than federal administrative authorities and the US president. Federal officials must integrate the directives into their management and planning activities and may be held accountable for failing to do so. Questions concerning whether any nonfederal party has standing to hold officials accountable, and whether federal trust responsibility or other authorities would pertain, remain open.
The bottom line is that because sacred sites lack specific and enforceable protections, federal land managers retain great discretion in weighing competing interests for land and resource use and preservation. Noting the political influence reflected in many federal decisions, Hardgrave refers to the "luck of the draw" associated with the "agency approach" of relying on land manager discretion. 30 Our review of federal decisions relating to Dził Nchaa Si An suggests the deck is often stacked against sacred-site protection, with wild cards palmed and ready to be played by the government and by applicants for permits to alter sacred sites.
We turn now to a summary of Mount Graham history with reference to instances in which federal officials could have asserted their trust responsibility and exercised management discretion in order to protect the mountain and its Apache devotees, yet chose not to.
MOUNT GRAHAM I: TIME IMMEMORIAL-2004
Dził Nchaa Si An is unique and worthy of special consideration by most measures. A "management unit" of the Coronado National Forest in southeastern Arizona, the range is the highest of the region's "sky islands" and Arizona's third highest, soaring to 3,265 meters (10,720 feet), well more than a mile above the surrounding desert and Gila River Valley. 31 Dził Nchaa Si An summits are headwaters for at least seven perennial streams that tumble through five major biotic zones. Located between the Southern Rocky Mountains and Mexico's Sierra Madre, and biologically isolated for millennia, the higher elevations have provided refuge for relic populations of plants and animals with adaptive strategies rooted in Pleistocene environmental conditions. Of particular note are stands of the oldest conifer trees in the US Southwest and associated habitats for threatened and endangered species, especially the Mount Graham red squirrel. 32 Located near the northern limit of the Chiricahua Apache homeland and the southern margins of Western Apache territory, the range is one of the Western Apache's holy mountains and is considered sacred by all of the region's Native peoples. 33 Since a determination by the Keeper of the National Register of Historic Places in 2002, Dził Nchaa Si An ranks as the largest (~330,000 acres) property listed on or formally determined eligible for the US National Register of Historic Places. 34 The mountain's notoriety derives from its employment as the host for MGIO, the observatory authorized by a unique peacetime congressional waiver of US environmental protection laws. On Dził Nchaa Si An, the University of Arizona and its partners continue to operate and plan expansions of facilities that desecrate an American Indian sacred site and degrade a rare and fragile ecosystem forming the heart of habitat officially designated as "critical" for the survival of the endangered Mount Graham red squirrel.
Exclusion of Apache control and despoliation of ancient environmental and cultural systems is nothing new in Apache territory. Dził Nchaa Si An has been a locus of conflict through increasingly intrusive iterations of conquest pursued by Spanish, Mexican, and American forays since the 1700s. 35 In 1866, General McDowell ordered establishment of a Western Apache military reservation at nearby Fort Goodwin, breaking treaty promises made to Apache leaders. 36 In 1869, soldiers of the 1st US Cavalry and 14th US Infantry killed twenty-eight Apaches and captured eight in the adjacent Mount Turnbull range. 37 Quickly tightening its grip, the United States established the White Mountain Reservation in 1871, ordering all Western Apaches to remain within reservation boundaries or be attacked. The reservation was enlarged by President Ulysses S. Grant's EO of 14 December 1872, returning Dził Nchaa Si An to Apache control, but vast tracts containing mineral and water sources, including all of Mount Graham, were subsequently "restored to the public domain." 38 In the later 1880s, as the United States completed subjugation of the Chiricahua Apaches led by Geronimo, one of the Dził Nchaa Si An summits, Heliograph Peak, was part of a network of Army signaling stations. 39 The United States eventually separated the Western Apache Nation into four federally recognized tribes resident on four reservations: the San Carlos Apache tribe of the San Carlos Reservation, the Tonto Apache tribe of the Tonto Reservation, the White Mountain Apache tribe of the Fort Apache Reservation, and the Yavapai-Apache Nation of the Camp Verde Reservation (see table 1 ). Immediately following Apache disenfranchisement, Euro-Americans vigorously exploited Mount Graham and its surrounding areas for minerals, fuel wood, timber, livestock pasture, and domestic and agricultural water. 40 The 1980 proposal for a twenty-telescope astrophysical research facility on the mountain grew out of regional economic shifts away from resource extraction, as well as university research priority shifts toward optical sciences and astronomy. 41 These trends collided with renewed Western Apache commitments to self-determination and cultural perpetuation, as well as growing environmentalist and land manager recognition of the significance and fragility of high-elevation ecosystems. 42 Public relations materials sponsored by MGIO proponents and uncritically accepted by the USFS emphasized purported Apache support for MGIO and compatibility between the telescopes and Mount Graham ecosystems. 43 Opposition by Western Apaches and their allies refuted proponent claims that the mountain was not sacred in Apache culture or significant in Apache history. 44 In 1993, former Coronado National Forest Supervisor Robert Tippeconic admitted complicity in university efforts to suppress evidence of
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Clinton EO 13007 directs all federal land managers to: "(1) accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners and (2) the range's importance to Apaches. 45 When Tippeconic's successor, James Abbott, delayed approval pending environmental reviews for the new road in the virgin forest to access the observatory site, he was summoned to a meeting and personally threatened with termination by US Senator John McCain. 46 Meanwhile, controversies over sacredness and the destruction of the endangered red squirrel habitat prompted cooperation among tribal representatives and dozens of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)-including the Sierra Club, the Center for Biological Diversity, and the Maricopa Audubon Society. The informal partnerships brought eleven lawsuits over the course of fourteen years, limited the project to three telescopes, discouraged partners from buying into MGIO, and thwarted prosecution of Apache religious practitioners for unwillingness to obtain government permits to visit portions of the mountain. 47 Additionally, due to steady opposition to MGIO and support for the mountain by Apache leaders, several recommendations from ACHP, and a formal USFS submittal that overcame University of Arizona reluctance, the National Park Service determined Mount Graham eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. The formal finding acknowledges the legitimacy of Western Apache oral and religious traditions and recognizes the significance of the mountain as home and source for gaan (or mountain spirits), sacred power, prayer places, and plants and other materials used in Apache religion. 48 Although the determination does not oblige MGIO removal or assure future protection, the ruling ensures that the mountain receives previously denied USFS consideration in NHPA reviews of federal project and program proposals, including any suggested changes to MGIO.
Giving lip service to the mountain's sacred significance, the University of Arizona and its MGIO partners at the Vatican Observatory, Max Planck Institute, Ohio State University, University of Minnesota, and University of Virginia have dedicated millions of taxpayer dollars to lobbying, policing, and legal and public relations campaigns. 49 The MGIO approach to the conflicts between the proposed telescopes and the sacred and fragile ecosystem was to fabricate Apache support for the project and obtain, without public review or any hearings, two congressional exemptions from authorities protecting land, air, water, and biodiversity. 50 The first of these exemptions, the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988, truncated the environmental and endangered-species review processes, deemed the requirements of the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act satisfied with regard to the construction of the first three telescopes and "necessary support facilities," and directed the issuance of a USFS permit for MGIO use of 8.6 acres. 51 MGIO completed two small "trainer" telescopes: the Vatican Advanced Technology Telescope and the Submillimeter Telescope. In 1997, the "Kolbe rider" invalidated a Ninth Circuit Court injunction prohibiting construction of the large binocular telescope (LBT) because workers felled old-growth forest without authorization and otherwise violated MGIO's USFS special-use permit. 52 Complications and blunders delayed LBT completion until 2008, and there are indications that it has yet to operate as designed and advertised. 53 As the dust settled on the first two decades of conflict over MGIO, Wendsler Nosie, the San Carlos Apache leader who was arrested by University of Arizona police for praying on Dził Nchaa Si An "without a permit," stated: "It has been a Holy Mountain since the beginning of creation. This has been passed orally through our ancestors. It was taught to us that it was given to the world. Our culture, our language, our religion is being threatened. All of this is our identity. Our identity is the land and where God has placed us in this part of the world. We cannot let it end." 54 Applying this perspective to federal land-management concerns, White Mountain Apache Tribal Council Chairman Dallas Massey Sr. wrote to the Coronado National Forest supervisor to reiterate Apache requests "that the Forest Service take affirmative steps to manage Mount Graham primarily as a place of outstanding significance in Western Apache religion, culture, and history-a sacred site." Massey outlined respectful avoidance as an Apache stewardship tenet, recommending "prohibition and avoidance of all activities that (1) interfere with the 'function' of the sacred site, (2) interfere with religious practitioners' use of the sacred site, (3) proceed without full and clear knowledge of the activities' consequences, or (4) Dził Nchaa Si An and other Western Apache Sacred Sites should be managed, in full partnership with the Western Apache tribes, for the protection of the physical integrity of those sacred sites and for the restoration of pre-1870 resource conditions and ecosystem processes. . . . The parties to the telescope operations within the Dził Nchaa Si An sacred site shall work with the Forest Service to specify a date by which the operations shall cease and the "footprint" restored to its pre-development condition, including removal of all roads, power lines, communication facilities, etc. 56 
MOUNT GRAHAM II: 2004-2008
In the wake of the Nuttall Complex fire that burned more than thirty thousand acres adjacent to MGIO in 2004, and as Apache leaders reached out with their concerns and requests, MGIO notified the USFS of plans for installing new microwave communications equipment to replace equipment then in use. 57 MGIO claimed the system was necessary in order to accommodate increased data flow required by LBT; remote observing, in which astronomers interface with instruments in real time without traveling to observatories; multi-instrument coordination, in which telescopes at various locations focus on a single object; and communications during telephone system outages.
Microwave under a Microscope
Neither the proposal nor the additional damage and desecration it heralded appear momentous at first glance, but several complicating factors recommend the case for close study. First, as the initial MGIO project to require intensive NHPA review since the mountain's 2002 formal determination of National Register eligibility, interested parties saw the microwave case as a likely precedent setter. Second, although proposals for federal land-management actions routinely trigger parallel compliance processes for multiple laws and regulations, the USFS decided that the microwave proposal required only NHPA compliance. The basis for this determination was the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act, which arguably preauthorized communications as "necessary support facilities," thus immunizing the microwave proposal from review under the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act-but not NHPA. Third, and not surprising given the project's contentious history, disagreements quickly escalated to the point at which intervention by ACHP and other Washington officials was necessary.
The case pushed NHPA review, commonly called the "Section 106 process" after the corresponding number in the statute, to seldom-used margins, where personal participation by senior officials illuminated previously implicit values and alignments. The MGIO microwave case thus offers a unique window into federal decision making in regard to undertakings affecting American Indian sacred sites. It illustrates dynamics that play critical roles in sacred-site protection efforts reliant upon the agency approach and the consultation and federal discretion at the heart of the processes that determine whether desecration will be allowed.
The Microwave Section 106 Process: On the Surface
As noted above, among various other mandates, NHPA's Section 106 requires federal agencies to consult with Indian tribes and other affected parties, to consider the effects of their proposed undertakings on historic properties, and to seek to avoid or reduce adverse effects. The initial parties to the NHPA review for the microwave included the federal action agency (US Department of Agriculture, Coronado National Forest), the undertaking proponent (University of Arizona), ACHP (at the request of the White Mountain Apache tribe), the Arizona SHPO, the four Western Apache tribes, and the Apache Survival Coalition (an NGO founded by Ola Cassadore-Davis to protect Dził Nchaa Si An and Western Apache cultural traditions).
The frustrations that came to characterize the microwave reviewanguish would not be too strong a word to describe the experience of the Apache elders who endured the experience-began prior to the formal initiation of the NHPA process. In August 2004, while the USFS was still analyzing the microwave proposal, MGIO began excavations to construct the microwave monopole. 58 In response to the unauthorized excavations, the USFS sent a "no adverse effect" determination for the entire microwave proposal to the Arizona SHPO. 59 The White Mountain Apache tribe exercised its prerogative in the Section 106 regulations and objected, stating that the proposed microwave system 60 would entail adverse effects to the characteristics, attributes, functions, and values central to Dził Nchaa Si An as a Western Apache Traditional Cultural Property and Sacred Site. . . . [T]he presence of structures and artificial objects-particularly metallic ones-as well as the operation of telescopes and other electronic and communications equipment impinge and infringe upon, interfere with, distort, and detract from these communications [with sacred power]. . . . No additional observatory-related impacts without commensurate restoration of our sacred Southern Mountain. 61 Shortly afterward, the USFS reversed its position and issued a determination that acknowledged the adverse effect for the proposal. In accord with NHPA regulatory protocols, the USFS then organized three consultation meetings. At the December 2004 meeting, MGIO representatives presented a summary of the proposed microwave system. Apache representatives related the long struggle against MGIO, the many previous insults to Apache people and beliefs, and the need for rigorous attention to good-faith consultation and Section 106 processes. USFS representatives reviewed the mountain's significance, as documented in the 2002 determination of eligibility, and went over each relevant step in NHPA, especially the memorandum of agreement (MOA) processes generally required when adverse effects to elements of significance cannot be avoided. Apache representatives requested more information about the following: microwave transmissions on the mountain; alternative means for accommodating MGIO needs; microwave impacts to wildlife and human health; options for reducing MGIO's visual impacts; rights acquired though the permitting process that might allow the microwave-system operator to remain following MGIO removal; and nonmetal alternatives to the monopole.
Apache representatives also suggested participation in the NHPA review and consultation process by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the entity responsible for licensing microwave transmission devices and the use of government-regulated airwaves and bandwidths. 62 USFS and MGIO representatives each pledged to fill in these information gaps. The parties agreed and affirmed that there was no compelling schedule for completing the NHPA process. Among the unresolved issues was whether the MOA anticipated by the USFS would address Mount Graham management as a sacred site in general or limit its purview to the installation of the microwave system alone. 63 The next meeting, in February 2005, centered on discussions of microwave-system alternatives and an overture from University of Arizona president, Peter Likins. Likins's representative, Robert Hershey, a professor at the University of Arizona Law School and a principal in the school's Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy Clinic, announced a temporary suspension of planning for additional MGIO telescopes and an intention to participate in a meeting with Western Apache elected representatives to address issues beyond the microwave.
At the same meeting, Vernelda Grant, director of the San Carlos Apache tribe's Office of Historic Preservation and Archaeology, distributed a statement that noted:
If you put up this microwave . . . it will hurt us by scrambling our prayers. . . . [Y]ou or your family may incur consequences from doing harm to the Mountain. . . . Apache resources can best be protected by managing the land to be as natural as it was in pre-white settlement times. . . . Asking the San Carlos Apache Tribe to participate in mitigating and/or deciding upon the current and future projects on Dził Nchaa si an is like asking us to participate in destroying and/or desecrating a holy place. 64 Grant and others discussed the moral dilemma of exchanging information with individuals lacking respect for the mountain and otherwise participating in sacred-site desecration. The Apache representatives concluded that the lack of alternate means for protecting the mountain obliged them to continue their reluctant and painful participation in hopes of obtaining the respect and protection required by the mountain. These subtleties were either misunderstood or disregarded by USFS staff, who seized upon Grant's final point-that Apaches incur significant liabilities through participation-paternalistically declaring additional discussions futile and announcing that a decision would be made and a draft MOA circulated shortly.
On 4 March 2005, in anticipation of the "summit" meeting scheduled by the university for 1 April at San Carlos, Likins released a "Declaration for the Western Apache Nation," which states, in part:
My purpose . . . is to begin a process intended to restore harmony between us on the Mountain.
To that end, I make the following declarations on behalf of the University of Arizona: (1) We recognize with respect that Mount Graham is an Apache Sacred Site, and commit to the preservation of an environment that is supportive of the traditional spiritual and religious values of the Apache peoples. (2) We support full access of the Apache peoples to Dził Nchaa Si An and their participation in planning for any future use of land on the Mountain. (3) No plans involving the University of Arizona are now under consideration for increasing the number of telescopes on Mount Graham. We declare an eighteen month hiatus on any such planning commencing April 1, 2005, so that our full energies can be devoted to our mutual efforts in good faith to establish a sound basis for future cooperation. (4) We respectfully recognize contrary views, but we believe that Dził Nchaa Si An can peacefully accommodate for the life of the observatory the coexistence of the Apache and the small numbers of astronomers whose telescopes now occupy a small land area of the Mountain, recognizing that these scientific personnel require access to their observatories by existing roadways, microwave communications, or their equivalents.
As President of the University of Arizona I deeply regret any words or actions that may have marred our relationship in recent years, and hope earnestly for an era of peaceful coexistence in harmony with the land and the heavens above.
The prospect of a summit to address issues encompassing the microwave consultation put the NHPA review on hold. 65 The delay brought pressure on the USFS from the university, as well as Graham County officials representing the microwave-system contractors, and the USFS decided to conclude the NHPA process rather than attempt to resolve outstanding fundamental issues. 66 On 27 April, discounting continued Apache requests for in-person ACHP involvement, the USFS distributed a draft MOA. 67 Because the MOA ignored most Apache concerns, Apache representatives asked ACHP to require a consultation meeting focused specifically on proposals for the reduction of adverse effects. Until that point, ACHP had not participated in the consultation meetings. On May 10, after a Mount Graham Coalition representative telephoned the ACHP associate general counsel and threatened to sue ACHP for failing to participate-a violation of the NHPA and the ACHP's trust responsibilities to the tribes-another consultation meeting was scheduled around attendance by the ACHP's staff liaison for the Department of Agriculture.
The June consultation meeting, which included the ACHP liaison and a Mount Graham Coalition representative, featured tense discussion but concluded with two key agreements. First, Apache representatives would provide MOA recommendations for reduction of adverse effects from the microwave system. Second, another meeting was scheduled for August to review the revised MOA and initiate discussion of a broader agreement to streamline future NHPA consultations. 68 On July 7, when the USFS abruptly contravened the process agreed upon in the June meeting and issued a new draft MOA before the stipulated date for receiving the Apache recommendations, cooperation in the Section 106 review fizzled. The White Mountain Apache tribe objected to the MOA, requested its withdrawal, and assembled a list of recommendations to reduce the microwave system's adverse effects.
The Apache suggestions specified construction-focused, mountain-wide, and regional steps to minimize, compensate for, and halt the progression of direct, indirect, and cumulative adverse effects to the Apache sacred site. The suggestions included:
• Administrative and financial penalties for permit violations by MGIO (for example, the preemptive construction of the microwave system); • Minimization of metal use in the monopole and of subsurface, mineral, plant, and animal disturbances associated with microwave system; • Use of special paints and other surface treatments to minimize the visual intrusion of the monopole tower and other MGIO facilities;
• Completion of a telecommunications status and needs assessment;
• Elimination of intrusive and disrespectful activities not required for astronomy (for example, commercial tours and lethal police and guard dog patrols); • Agreement not to expand MGIO beyond the existing boundaries and to specify conditions and time frames (even distant ones) for MGIO removal and site restoration; • Specification of processes and time frames for the completion of the nomination of Western Apache sacred mountains to the National Register of Historic Places; • Assessment of accumulating MGIO adverse effects in conjunction with the adverse effects from the proposed ski area expansion on the San Francisco Peaks, near Flagstaff, Arizona, and the proposed extension of copper mining to desecrate and destroy the venerated place known as the Apache Leap, near Superior, Arizona. 69
Dismissing these suggestions as either beyond the scope of the NHPA review or in conflict with the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act, the USFS redistributed the MOA-this time already signed by the USFS and the university-and requested signatures from the tribes, SHPO, and ACHP. The request was prefaced by the questionable claims that "no new information or ideas have been offered. . . . [T] he Forest has made a reasonable and good faith effort to involve the tribes and the Apache Survival Coalition and to address their concerns." 70 Perhaps needless to say, the other parties refused to sign the MOA. Noting the USFS violation of the June agreements, ACHP recommended use of a laminated wood monopole and development of consultation protocols for future Mount Graham projects. 71 Similarly rejecting these recommendations, the USFS sought to move beyond the microwave and proposed an August meeting, following MOA signature, to discuss general Mount Graham management issues, noting that the MOA "commits to developing a more collaborative and cooperative relationship." 72 The San Carlos Apache response represented Apache views on this apparent end-run: "When the Forest Service indicates that it is ready to seriously consider alternatives that do not harm Apache resources or practices, then we will be happy to meet with you." 73 Unwilling to resume microwave discussions, the USFS notified ACHP that it would exercise its NHPA option to terminate consultation formally unless ACHP withdrew the recommended changes to the MOA. 74 Because MOAs are incomplete without ACHP signature, NHPA's Section 106 regulations require the agency head to attempt to resolve any conflict with ACHP. 75 If this fails, ACHP must solicit input from consulting parties and the public before providing final comments to the agency and allowing the project to proceed without a signed MOA.
Cognizant of MGIO opponents' willingness to file lawsuits, ACHP and the USFS were motivated to resolve their disagreement. 76 Nonetheless, despite ACHP insistence that the microwave consultation was incomplete, in November the chief of the USFS terminated the NHPA process, giving ACHP forty-five days to gather views from the consulting parties and respond with final comments. 77 Answering ACHP's solicitation, San Carlos Apache tribe Chairwoman Kathy Kitcheyan affirmed that the "current proposed microwave communications project is yet another harmful disruption of traditional practices," and requested that "the Forest Service and University fully disclose all proposed future activities and construction in and around the telescope site . . . and consider traditional Apache uses of Mt. Graham's resources against other, multiple uses." 78 The Yavapai-Apache Nation asserted that "the Forest Service has unrightfully abandoned their trust responsibilities . . . [and] supported similar assaults to the landscape and critical aspects of our traditional culture on Dził Cho (the San Francisco Peaks)." 79 The university's comments emphasized the length of the decision-making process and the safety risks incurred by what MGIO characterized as an unreliable communications system. 80 Along with other issues, the White Mountain Apache tribe's comments addressed urgency, noting:
The record unambiguously shows that the sole impasse was and is USFS refusal to acknowledge and reasonably consider effect avoidance and reduction measures. . . . The LBT remains incomplete and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has not approved the license. . . . There is ample time to return to the real business of avoiding and reducing effects. . . .
If there is a true urgency in this matter, it is not that of the permittee, but rather in our increasingly desperate quest to avoid yet another federal decision that not only fails to consider Apache values concerning the inestimable importance of our sacred mountains, but flies in the face of good and fair governance in general and federal fiduciary duty. . . . [T]he White Mountain Apache Tribe must insistout of our deep respect for divine power and for our ancestors, our children, and ourselves-that any and every adverse effect be reduced to the reasonable minimum and that truly irreducible adverse effects be balanced with the respectful protection of a comparable area or value. . . . ACHP action is required not only to preserve Dził Nchaa Si, but the NHPA process that has, sadly, become our only viable means for influencing USFS and UA [University of Arizona] actions. 81 Instead of employing these views as the basis for final comments, however, ACHP engaged in additional discussions with USFS and Department of Agriculture officials. The discussions took ACHP beyond the forty-five days stipulated in the regulations and required the technicality of a formal USFS request for additional time under the strictures of the NHPA: "I am now more optimistic that renewed consultation on these terms can lead to an agreement. . . . I am requesting a two-week extension of the 45-day period within which the Council must transmit its comment to the head of the agency. . . . I look forward to working with the consulting parties to make one final effort to reach accommodation on this project in order to move forward together in a spirit of cooperation." 82 In early March 2006, ACHP Chairman John Nau responded to the USFS chief, Dale Bosworth. Instead of final comments, the letter conveyed an MOA essentially identical to that distributed by the USFS seven months previously and already signed by ACHP. 83 Other than the unexplained withdrawal of ACHP objections to the MOA, the only noteworthy result of the protracted discussions in Washington was the ACHP chairman's proposal for a "listening session" to "ensure improved relations and a spirit of collaboration in jointly planning for the future of Mount Graham." The USFS and university then promptly signed the "new" MOA and circulated it to the other consulting parties for their cosignatures.
Despite repeated references to collaboration and consultation in the correspondence, neither the tribes nor the Arizona SHPO were given opportunities to participate in these crucial latter stages of the NHPA process. All of them refused to sign, citing the MOA's inattention to their significant unresolved concerns, as well as the lack of good faith and integrity in the conduct of the process by the USFS and ACHP. James Garrison, the Arizona SHPO, formally terminated his participation, noting "no ability to further resolve any perceived adverse effects within this document." 84 For Garrison, who has served as the Arizona SHPO since 1992, this was the first and only refusal to sign an MOA. 85 Garrison's rejection arguably rendered the document invalid and void. 86 It certainly earned him the respect of the Apache participants and their allies.
Although USFS responsibilities pursuant to NHPA regarding the microwave were thus completed and the USFS was free to amend the MGIO permit to allow microwave-system installation, the system could not be constructed or operated without an FCC license. In a statement signed by representatives of each of the four Western Apache tribes, the Apaches advised the FCC that the proposed microwave licensure poses both challenges associated with highly irregular handling of the process by USFS and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) and an opportunity to improve upon and properly conclude the Section 106 process concerning the proposed activities subject to this undertaking.
Despite the unacceptably premature and unwarranted termination of the Section 106 process by the USFS, the Apaches stand willing to work with FCC, the applicant, USFS, ACHP, the Arizona SHPO, and other parties in an effort to avoid and reduce and mitigate the adverse effects associated with the proposed microwave licensure. 87 Based on an unsubstantiated ACHP claim that the MOA was valid without an SHPO signature, FCC reneged on its oral pledge and refused to conduct an NHPA review and consultation for the undertaking of issuing a license for microwave operations. 88 Microwave-system installation and monopole construction on Dził Nchaa Si An proceeded in the fall of 2006.
The Microwave Section 106 Process: Behind the Scenes
Based on the approximately 2,600 pages of documents included in responses to the public records requests filed by the White Mountain Apache tribe, we estimate that the NHPA review process for the microwave system involved no fewer than a dozen interparty meetings, one hundred telephone calls, three hundred fifty e-mail messages, and two thousand hours of scheduled work time for personnel employed by ACHP, USFS, FCC, SHPO, and the tribes.
These investments, virtually all of which were made with public resources, did more harm than good. The tribes won no meaningful recognitions of their concerns, much less concessions. The emotional toll, most especially on Apache elders and religious practitioners, is impossible to calculate. MGIO had to operate without the new system for two years. The USFS and ACHP squandered the Apache trust it had worked hard to establish through Mount Graham's 2002 determination of eligibility. ACHP, USFS, MGIO, and the White Mountain Apache tribe each bade farewell to burned-out staff members who served as points of contact for the process. SHPO refusal to sign the MOA invited intense scrutiny and intrusive criticism from some federal and Arizona state elected officials.
What went wrong? The above-described proceedings tell only part of the story, falling short of assigning responsibility for the costly, contentious, and counterproductive process. The university blamed everybody except itself, reserving particular disdain for USFS engagement of the tribes when, from the university perspective, the conclusion was inevitable due to the ArizonaIdaho Conservation Act's allowance for necessary support facilities. The forest supervisor blamed ACHP: "the Council has consulted only with certain representatives of the involved tribes and not with all consulting parties. This pattern of selective and undisclosed consultation and negotiation has . . . contributed to a sense of mistrust concerning the Council's motives and ultimate objectivity in the consultation process." 89 The supervisor's rebuke can be applied more broadly. Unbeknownst to the other parties and prior to the first consultation meeting, the university engaged lawyers and lobbyists to assure that the microwave system would be installed as planned. 90 The microwave monopole installed in 2006 was prepurchased and ready to install in August 2004, when the university initiated unauthorized construction. 91 When Department of Agriculture attorneys countered university arguments that no NHPA review was required, the university claimed that the safety of MGIO personnel was at risk due to "unreliable" communications. 92 Just four days after the initial consultation meeting, a candid e-mail to Buddy Powell, the MGIO director, from a university representative in the NHPA process revealed and sought to remedy the lack of good faith participation by MGIO, imploring, Do not send the monopole up the mountain. This is a very bad idea. [Ratje] and I said at the meeting on 10 December 2004 that we would not do any additional work . . . until consultation is done. . . . 2. It will be perceived yet again that we are not serious about consultation-that we are just giving lip service to mollify the Apaches and their concerns. It will be interpreted that we plan to go ahead, perhaps even that we are working other angles to go ahead with this (Congress, Graham County, etc.). 3. It will undermine any hope/chance of improving the process. . . . Once again, we say one thing in a meeting then go behind the scenes. . . . I (along with the rest of us) will be labeled a liar or at best an ineffective gofer. . . . It makes us dishonest. 93 Powell never made good on his threat to continue with the illegal installation, but MGIO operatives proceeded with surreptitious plans to undermine and short circuit the NHPA review and President Likins's attempts to establish a dialogue with the Apaches. 94 University and federal officials held teleconferences and meetings with various elected and agency representatives during the NHPA review and without informing the other parties or sharing the results. 95 When ACHP initially refused to sign the MOA, the university postured with indignation: "ACHP comments . . . do not acknowledge the two years of good faith effort undertaken by the USFS, SHPO, and UA to address the concern and arrive at realistic solutions." 96 When this failed and ACHP remained unconvinced, the university deployed tactics used in 1988 to exempt MGIO from environmental and endangered-species protection laws, and again in 1997 to invalidate the Ninth Circuit injunction against LBT construction.
It puts a lie to all John
This time the university and its lobbyists had groomed Congressman Rick Renzi and Senator John Kyl. 97 University officials set the agenda for an 11 November 2005 meeting among Renzi, Department of Agriculture Undersecretary and former timber industry lobbyist Mark Rey, Graham County Supervisor Mark Herrington, Steward Observatory Director Peter Strittmatter, and Buddy Powell. 98 The outcome was Rey's suggestion to contact John Nau, the ACHP chairman. 99 On 1 and 18 December 2005, and again on 11 January 2006, Powell signed letters to Nau and ACHP Executive Director John Fowler. In February, Renzi and Kyl sent a trumped-up congressional inquiry letter to Rey, again claiming that the microwave equipment was essential to MGIO personnel safety. 100 The political barrage is the only explanation available for John Nau's otherwise unjustified and suspicion-inviting decision to abandon previous ACHP commitments and authorize an MOA that excluded Apache and SHPO participation and perspectives. 101 Although there was never a documented explanation, there was celebration. The USFS regional archaeologist wrote to Klima, "Amazed that you were able to orchestrate a success out of this. . . . This is a much more positive outcome for everyone." 102 This foolish statement from a senior USFS representative aptly reflects federal and university officials' view of the NHPA process and the Apaches' consultations as an inconvenience. There is almost no indication of university or federal agency attempts to think or act constructively in response to Apache concerns or of USFS or ACHP intention to discharge Indian and public trust responsibilities by avoiding and reducing harms to Dził Nchaa Si An and the people who rely upon it. The White Mountain Apache tribe summed up the process as a "definitive example of bad faith consultation," observing that USFS willingness to impose consultation terms unfavorable to all except the undertaking proponent, and to then terminate the consultation when the non-proponent signatory and consulting parties object to the imposition sets a dangerous and untenable NHPA procedural precedent. . . . The White Mountain Apache Tribe has been a cooperative and constructive participant in NHPA processes relating to our sacred mountains for more than a decade, patiently awaiting the arrival of the evenhandedness, good faith, and attention to trust responsibility that underlie all good governance. We have collaborated freely . . . working within the imperfect confines of NHPA. . . . Yet the disrespect for our lands, our people, and our culture persists and now dramatically escalates as USFS abandons most of its fiduciary and statutory responsibilities in order to provide expedited and possibly unnecessary special service. 103 
DISCUSSION: CONSULTATION CASE STUDY AS CAUTIONARY TALE
Like any decent case study, the Mount Graham microwave NHPA episode tells a compelling story, sheds clarifying light on similar phenomena, and prompts critical discussion of ways to do things better. Although the microwave case is unique, it is also representative in that the USFS has yet to take Apache concerns to heart, employ its discretionary authority, and inform a proponent of a project on Mount Graham-MGIO, Arizona Department of Transportation, City of Safford, and so forth-that the proposed undertaking is harmful to Dził Nchaa Si An and the Apache people and shall not proceed.
Although Mount Graham's case history appears to be unique and complex, the unbroken string of decisions favoring MGIO alteration and desecration points to a single rationale for discretionary desecration. Far more than federal law and policy per se, we think the pattern of desecrating decisions stems from habitual federal agency prioritization of multiple-use mandates over American Indian and public trust responsibilities. In this and almost all other cases involving American Indian sacred sites, NHPA implementation has heralded destruction and defilement, not preservation. This case study and the generally dismal treatment of American Indian sacred sites on public lands indicate the need for strategic advocacy to influence the American public, agency officials, proponents of desecrating actions, and courts. The seemingly reasonable presumption that these entities will seek to understand and deal justly with sacred-site issues is, sadly, unjustified, even naïve.
As we await direct legislative protection of sacred sites and "top-down" reform of NHPA implementation, parties to NHPA reviews of actions that adversely affect sacred sites have the opportunity to work together. Our suggestion is that these collaborations work from the "bottom up" to create better, more rigorous, complete, and accessible Section 106 and National Environmental Policy Act processes that create more balanced and considerate outcomes. 104 Because of the centrality of consultation to the success of Section 106 and other processes relating to sacred-site protection, we call for greater attention to four overlapping consultation standards: respect and balance; timeliness and appropriate breadth; completeness and appropriate depth; and transparency. 105 Grounded in our personal experience in hundreds of multiparty processes, as well as recent work to identify "best consultation practices," these standards suggest pathways to principled terms of engagement, as well as baselines for assessing performance in consultations pursuant to NHPA and other authorities. 106 Because of the many contentious histories of relationships among proponents, agencies, tribes, and other parties, there is ample potential for improved communications and collaborations based on the specification and alignment of common interests. One good place to start is with a shared definition of consultation. Our suggestion: exchange of information and views as part of a good-faith effort to reach consensus. 107 We proceed by reviewing each of these four consultation standards in terms relevant to Dził Nchaa Si An, American Indian sacred-sites protection more generally, and interests expressed by place-based communities concerning participation in government decisions that affect them.
Respect and Balance
There is no substitute for sincere consideration of other participants and their perspectives. Respectful attention to individual and organizational aspirations and limitations are foundations for the thought, communication, and action that engender trust, mutually satisfying relationships, and civil society. Even in the context of strict government-to-government relations, consultation occurs between individuals. A professional atmosphere for consultation, grounded in trust, may be a better long-term strategy than reliance on personal relationships and face-to-face communications. 108 Some proven means for relationship building include the up-front recognition of decision-making authorities and the establishment of clear and open communications with at least one duly designated representative from as many as possible of the potentially affected tribes and interested parties. In the ideal world these delegates, as well as the agency officials charged with consultation management, would be individuals interested in, informed about, and empowered to act upon the issues under discussion.
In the real world there are often legitimate suspicions concerning how consultation participants communicate both up and down the chains of command. It is reasonable for all parties to require documentation of delegations of authority for their counterparts and to encourage other parties either to adopt a single official position on a particular issue or to acknowledge that no position will be available within agreed-upon time frames. The presumed unity of the executive branch of the US government allows a single "lead" federal agency to manage processes in which other agencies have interests without close involvement by those agencies. Some neighboring or closely related tribes also have formal and informal "division of labor" arrangements for consultations.
Problems in the microwave consultation were probably inevitable due to the long and ongoing history of divergent and conflicting interests. The university rejected calls to abandon plans for additional telescopes or to specify a date for the removal of the facilities and the restoration of the mountain. Specific problems in the microwave review arose because MGIO officials evinced only superficial commitments to the process or the other parties. MGIO challenged the authority of the USFS to mandate NHPA compliance, as well as the authority and integrity of representatives from the White Mountain and San Carlos tribes. 109 Apache representatives raised concerns about allowing astronomers to dominate the terms of tribal engagement concerning broader issues in their relationships with the USFS, state of Arizona, and University of Arizona. The forest supervisor ultimately responsible for deciding whether to authorize the microwave installation and how to reduce and avoid the microwave system's adverse effects to the mountain did not attend the consultation meetings. Only with the microwave system installed, and the Apache frustration complete, have federal officials made overtures to engage in government-to-government communications. 110 Mutual respect may remain elusive in light of the pro-project imbalance that has come to dominate NHPA reviews. This bias was not contemplated or foreseen in the creation of NHPA in 1966. The law's preamble states, "historic and cultural properties . . . should be preserved as a living part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation." 111 But NHPA's intent is regularly subordinated to changing definitions of progress and responsive government. 112 As noted above, NHPA is too often treated as a procedural hurdle, or part of a compliance checklist, rather than a tool for preserving historic properties, improving federal decision making, or remedying both immediate and transgenerational impacts of damage to and desecration of places and lands having cultural and religious significance. During the microwave-system consultations, federal and university officials structured the NHPA process to create an illusion of procedural compliance rather than to analyze, avoid, and reduce adverse effects. Agencies dedicated vast amounts of staff time to expediting the Section 106 process, justifying inattention to Apache concerns, and creating a legally defensible compliance record. If any serious deliberations focused on NHPA-mandated avoidance and reduction of adverse effects, these were not documented in agency or university records.
Timeliness and Appropriate Breadth
Beginning consultation while projects and programs are in the early planning stages, and before commitments are made, may be the single best means for engaging the broadest range of relevant topics and appropriate solutions to real and perceived concerns. Early consultation may mean discussion about the consultation process, including diligence to ensure that all parties are aware of each step in the process, of how and why the steps are to be taken, of the junctures at which decisions will be made, and of the ambit of decision-maker discretion. Starting early and involving all parties in subsidiary decisions about consultation processes, formats, agenda, time lines, and contingencies improves prospects for a final, consensus decision.
The USFS failed to include several key issues in the microwave consultation process, including the specific identification of the area of potential effect for the microwave system, the measures to be employed for the identification of prospective historic properties, and the format and time lines for the process. 113 The USFS was clear and consistent in declaring that it lacked the authority to disallow the microwave replacement to proceed but neglected to clarify and focus the consultation upon those issues subject to agency discretion-most notably measures for avoiding and reducing adverse effects. The NHPA review would likely have been facilitated by an early determination of whether the process was going to include efforts to agree on more general management issues or merely serve as a model for future consultations. In the end, it detracted from both.
Completeness and Appropriate Depth
Successful consultation includes opportunities for distinctive and detailed consideration of each consulting party's issues and concerns. Commonalities and divergences among consulting parties may be employed to structure consultations. For example, individual meetings or portions thereof might be allocated for presentations or discussions focused on specific parties, with reports being shared with all. Each party might be given the opportunity to host a consultation or have primary responsibility for all or part of a meeting agenda. It may be advisable for each party or groups of parties to have the exclusive attention of decision makers, and for each to have equal time. Similar considerations indicate that employing information and perspective from one party to assess or address issues of potential interest to a second party should be avoided, as should the pursuit of multiple points of contact in order to identify individuals or organizations more likely to provide sensitive or accommodating information.
Creating opportunities for consulting parties to provide firsthand accounts of the issues they know and care about is invaluable. Visits to project areas and other landscapes are often optimal contexts for consultation. Authoritative publications and experts not recognized by the parties may provide important background information and suggest topics for discussion, but these sources should not be given precedence over first-person knowledge and representation, especially when sacred sites and privileged knowledge are involved. Wherever appropriate, knowledgeable leaders or specialists should be engaged as full partners or hired with mutual consent to assist in meeting proponent or agency responsibilities for large, complicated, or controversial projects or activities.
Although a well-established unity of Western Apache perspectives has prevented such issues from detracting from the microwave consultation, it might have been useful for the USFS also to engage non-Western Apache tribes with interests in Mount Graham. In this and other ways, the federal parties (USFS, ACHP, and FCC) neglected fiduciary duties obligating trustees to optimize advantages for beneficiaries. Explicit recognition of tribes' rights, privileges, and opportunities to influence agency decision making might have helped to ease tribal representatives' legitimate suspicions or promote federal officials' effective communications.
Transparency
Consistent and unequivocal disclosure of relevant authorities, obligations, and goals by all parties is a sure path to understanding government decisions, even when the parties do not agree with the decision. High-integrity consultation processes are built upon respectful and definitive statements of the purpose and scope of the consultation, including applicable legal and policy mandates and schedule milestones. Ensuring consulting parties' access to all data used in decision making may demystify the process and facilitate understanding and accounting of the range of issues and values at stake.
Enhancing access to information and process must be clearly distinguished from creating any obligation for parties to assume agency duties or responsibilities without fair compensation or to participate in project planning or consultation processes in which they have no interest. When representatives do contribute beyond the scope of the consultation, their contributions should be fully acknowledged and compensated when appropriate. Recognition of the costs associated with consultation and creative collaboration to reduce and share financial and time commitments can engender trust and foster efficiencies and consensus building. When mistrust persists to the point of impeding communications, as it too often does in consultations relating to federal undertakings affecting sacred sites, it may be useful to shift the consultation focus to procedural matters, such as the use of a professional facilitator or mediator known or acceptable to the parties. It may also be helpful to reduce or relax time pressures that can distort the process and defeat its purpose.
The NHPA review for the Mount Graham microwave system suggests many avenues for increasing transparency. Despite repeated calls from Apache representatives to evaluate critically university claims for the microwave system as a "necessary support facility" and to consider alternatives, the USFS and FCC accepted the MGIO needs assessment and system design without any independent technical review. The Apaches' federal trustees should have taken to heart the Apache suspicions that the microwave system would be installed in accord with the original plan regardless of the Section 106 outcome. The agencies should have investigated this allegation and, at a minimum, informed the Apaches or other consulting parties of this debilitating encumbrance on the consultation process.
FINAL THOUGHTS
When embarked upon with good faith and open minds, consultations concerning sacred sites may guide agencies and other parties to deeper and broader understanding of lands and peoples, and toward inclusive and balanced cultural and ecological heritage stewardship policy and practice. As is true for any disciplined commitment, the adoption of the foregoing consultation standards and principles entails substantial investments, most especially in communications and learning to listen more fully. As a gateway to understanding others, true listening stimulates questions relevant to all parties. Experience and study of consultation appears to be converging on the general formula that respect and listening lead to trust, trust to collaboration, collaboration to success, and success to subsequent success.
Safeguarding places sacred to communities that lack the political, social, and economic power to do so independently is the sort of atonement and generosity likely to be required in the face of mounting global demographic, resource, and ecological challenges. American Indian sacred sites are among the sources of the wisdom that humanity will likely need to meet such challenges. Lamentably, these continue to be disregarded, desecrated, and destroyed-sacrificed on altars of greed and caprice. Until Congress commits its plenary powers to the protection of sacred sites, and leaving aside options for negotiation and direct action, tribes and other sacred-site protectors must make the best of the limited legal and procedural tools available. By obliging tribes to act as supplicants, prevailing NHPA protocol relegates pleas for basic respect and religious freedom to case-by-case consultations, agency decision making, and the uncertainties of Washington and special-interest power brokering.
Even on federal lands, where the government enjoys wide discretion over development activities and solemn responsibility to discharge their public trust and Indian fiduciary duties, sacred sites seldom benefit from protections on par with those accorded to other kinds of historic properties. Sacred sites deemed holy and worthy of utmost respect too often receive less protection under NHPA than common buildings, bridges, or artifacts. Disparities between the limited protections afforded sacred sites and the widespread consideration given to nonsacred American Indian cultural objects further underscore the institutionalized biases against place-based American Indian religion. Adding insult to injury, the USFS and other federal agencies entrusted with the management of lands recently used and occupied by American Indians are routine in their inattention to trust responsibility. This fiduciary duty could and should be applied to everything from basic consultations, to decisions about sacred-sites protection, to standard agency operating procedures. 114 That this is not so flies in the face not only of the Trust Doctrine but also of published agency policies. 115 Desecration does not have to happen but is likely to continue until the "culture" of federal land management embraces American Indian trusteeship or Congress provides further, more specific direction.
The case study offered here provides an example of how NHPA can be followed to the letter without a hint of commitment to or achievement of its core purpose of protecting highly significant cultural, religious, and historical sites. The Apache representatives participated continuously and vigorously in consultations with their federal-agency trustees and other parties, providing unambiguous requests from respected elders and elected officials for decisions that would have avoided and reduced the adverse effects of the microwave system on Dził Nchaa Si An. These requests were systematically and deliberately disregarded and had no measurable impact on any USFS decision.
The cautionary tale here is that the public face of consultation is often little more than the tip of an iceberg of federal agency communications with special interests. Tribes and sacred-site protection advocates face great challenges in seeking to influence agency discretion or achieve sacred-site protection. 116 Dził Nchaa Si An thus emerges as a "tragic precedent in the protection and perpetuation of Apache culture, in the proper and meaningful conduct of federal agencies' tribal consultations pursuant to fiduciary and statutory responsibilities, and in the evenhanded and objective management of public lands and resources." 117 Embedded in all great challenges, however, are great opportunities. We close with a final call for some combination of fully defensible sacred-site legislation; respectful, equitable, efficient, and transparent NHPA consultation protocols; and basic human compassion for the plight of dispossessed persons. Our continuing failure to provide equal protection for American Indian religions and religious sites is far more than a blemish on our national honor. 118 Gross negligence in our defense of American Indians from the "tyranny of the majority" and in our extension of the full benefits of liberty to the Native Americans we have claimed authority over and upon whose lands we live and prosper constitutes a potentially fatal flaw in our national character and our dedication to the principles underlying our Constitution and shared vision. 119 We must, as a nation, either do better or relinquish our claims to greatness.
As is true for many prominent landforms in historically and politically contested geographies, the mountain range that is the subject of this article has various names in various languages. Today, in the predominantly English-speaking state of Arizona, the range is most commonly called the "Graham Mountains" or, in reference to one of its highest peaks, simply "Mount Graham." Another commonly used referent to the range, "Pinaleños," is the most persistent name inherited from Spanish speakers who sought control over mountains and surrounding territories in the 1700s and 1800s. "Big Seated Mountain" is our translation for Dził Nchaa Si An, the most widely recognized name for the range among speakers of the Western Apache language.
7. The National Historic Preservation Act (hereinafter cited as NHPA) mandates federal agency consideration of the effects of projects on "historic properties" (meaning places, structures, and objects with historical significance). 8. An anonymous reviewer of our article aptly critiqued the use of EuroAmerican worldviews and existential categories to understand American Indian spirituality. The critique underscored the relational ways of knowing that bind many Native Americans to other-than-human persons (including some sacred sites) in "webs of interdependent reciprocity. 
